How has the concept of soft power and public diplomacy been
interpreted in the context of China? How is it distinct?
As China (and it’s 1.3 billion residents) has evolved into a
world superpower, its soft power and public diplomacy has remained inherently
tied to their level of power. While other countries rely on being
culturally sophisticated, financially secure, or great for tourists, China seems
to project only one thing: its rise into economic (and political) superpower
status.
To more developed countries, such some European nations, Japan,
and the U.S., China portrays itself as a collaborator in the “harmonious
society” of states, and an equal among many in a multilateral world.
Non-threatening, the new and bountiful China, it is assured, will benefit all
and contribute positively to the development of the global economy and
community.
China also hopes to leverage its soft power with sometimes
overlooked or oppressed countries in Africa and South America. Here, the
rise of China marks a shift away from “imperial” relationships, and
demonstrates a new model to emulate: “Beijing Consensus”. As Lee points
out, the PRC provides money to countries that others in the global community
refuse to invest in, mostly due to human rights concerns. Countries want
to get on the good side of the future(?) superpower, win early advantage as their
designated importer of copper, soybean, or bauxite, and gain influence through
their new ally. Many companies and countries are willing to take losses
to maintain these ties, in the earnest belief that they will pay off in the
end.
Although some other aspects of soft power are trickling through
– growing numbers of students learning Chinese as a second language, interest
in Pacific-centric international groups and organizations – they all stem from
hitching onto China’s rise. Other countries are looking to China, not to
emulate their culture, their politics, or their economic model that but to
maximize their economic potential. Even the “Beijing Consensus” concept
is from Western academics, not Chinese public diplomacy. Within the
discourse of a necessarily powerful, but peaceful, China it seems that other
factors – poor human rights, environmental degradation, mistreatment of
minorities – have been ignored.
And this may be the point. China wants
to maintain focus on the one, big net positive, which is its economic
potential. This may be as much, if not more so, for domestic consumption
than for the usual realm of public diplomacy. By shouting about its
economic rise, China tries to drown out any opposition to other facets of soft
power, and of its government practices. Whether this PD tactic can remain
viable in the long run remains to be seen, and whether China will be able to
rely on more than the world’s largest consumer base to ensure soft power in the
future.
It's interesting, because China has retreated from trying to propose that it's economic model is something it can export in contrast to Western development models. Spokespersons have said that its model is unique to China. However, I think it's clear that a lot of China's soft power activities are designed to create an environment where it can secure resources that sustain its economic development. China is very resource dependent, and it needs a favorable political climate to secure these goods. Soft power is a component of a larger "comprehensive national power" that helps to sustain its legitimacy as a respectable international partner (at least in how chinese official talk about soft power).
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